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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 1996, the Jamaican government presented to
Parliament its decision to repatriate fifty-seven Cubans who had
sought refuge in Jamaica.' This decision was the subject of extensive public discussion 2 and was not unanimously supported by
Jamaican political and civil groups.A Much of the debate focused
on the moral, economic, and political aspects of relations between
Jamaica and Cuba, while only limited attention was placed on
the legal aspects of the government's decision. 4 The public may
have assumed that the government's conclusions were legally
sound, thereby focusing the debate on nonlegal, nontechnical is-

1. Statement by the Honorable Seymour Mullings, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, on the Cuban Asylum-Seekers to the Jamaican House of Representatives, May 15,
1996, at 4 [hereinafter Statement by the Honorable Mullings].
2. See, e.g., Gail Hoad, Cubans with Landed Status Named, DAILY GLEANER, May 17,
1996; Cubans Fly Home, DAILY GLEANER, May 21, 1996; Vivienne Siva, Sorry Amigos: Government Boots Cuban Refugees, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 16, 1996, at 1; Rhan Powell, Cubans in
Hiding-Some SaidFlown Out of the Island JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 20,1996, at 1; This Cuban
Refugee Foam,JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 22, 1996, at 6; Lionel Russell, Refugee Status, JAMAICA
OBSERVER, May 23, 1996, at 6; Cub% JamaicaStrike Deal, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 24, 1996;
CubansSent Home, JAMAICA HERALD, May 16,1996.
3. See Hoad, supra note 2. On May 15, 1996, the National Democratic Movement of Jamaica issued a statement calling on the government to reconsider its decision. On May 16, 1996,
the Jamaica Labour Party described the government's decision as one steeped in legalism. Id
See also Letter from Sister Joan Clare of Fransiscan Sisters of Allegany Refugee Office to the
Jamaican Foreign Minister Seymour Mullings (May 18, 1996), noted in Cubans in Hiding,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 20, 1996, at 1. Cf Statement from the Jamaica Council of Churches,
May 25, 1996, noted in Council of Churches Backs Government, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 26,
1996.
4. On refugee law, see ATLE GRAHL-MADsEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, SYMPOSIUM ON
THE PROMOTION, DISSEMINATION AND TEACHING OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES, COLLECTED PROCEEDINGS (1982) [hereinafter UNHCR, COLLECTED PROCEEDINGS];
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984); UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR, HANDBOOK]. For older references to asylum
practice, see HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS; EMER DE VATrEL, LE DRo=T DES GENS
(1916).
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sues. 5 This Article examines the legal issues which arose out of
the Jamaican government's controversial decision. Although the
government was aware of relevant points of international law, its
approach was somewhat problematic.
Specifically, this Article argues that the government's overall
approach to evaluating asylum claims did not properly reflect the
circumstances under which an individual may claim refugee
status according to international law. Although the government
established procedural mechanisms to address these issues, the
Cuban episode highlights the inadequacies of these mechanisms
to handle current refugee questions and indicates the need for
change. Implementation of legislation delineating the country's
international legal obligations would likely enhance the protection of refugees in Jamaica.
Although this Article primarily analyzes the legal aspects of
the 1996 Cuban applications, it acknowledges the broader political significance of the episode. While the end of the Cold War has
not led to a decrease in the number of refugees internationally,6
refugee status increasingly appears to be based on ethnic and
nationalistic divisions rather than on ideological cleavages. 7
In contrast, the effects of the Cold War are still evident in
the case of Cuban refugees in the Caribbean as the United States
and Cuba remain locked in a political conflict rooted in differing
ideological convictions and hegemonic aspirations. 8 Recalcitrant
5. See, e.g., Calvin Bowen, The Cuban Connection, DAILY GLEANER, May 22, 1996, at A4
('Vhile acknowledging the strictly legalistic rightness of the decision, some of us are somewhat
disheartened over it.").
6. Estimated figures of the global refugee population, 1989-1995:
Year
Population (in millions)
1989
14.8
1990
14.9
1991
17.2
1992
17.0
1993
18.2
1994
16.4
1995
14.4
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES:
IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS 248 (1995) [hereinafter UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES].
7. See id at 11-55; GILBERT LOESCHER, REFUGEE MOVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY 3 (Adelphi Papers No. 268, 1992); Tiyasuiana Maluwa, The Refugee Problem and the
Quest for Peace and Security in Southern Africa, 7 INTL J. REFUGEE L. 653, 654-57 (1995); Bill
Frelick, Preventive Detention, 5 PEACE REv. 305 (1993).
8. For historical overview, see LESTER D. LANGIY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
CARIBBEAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 195-217 (4th ad., 1989); THOMAS G. PATERSON,
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Cold War aspects of U.S.-Cuban relations have led to inconsistencies in U.S. refugee policy and have prompted the perception
that refugee matters are almost exclusively governed by political
concerns. Consequently, this Article analyzes the legal issues
within the broader political context of the 1996 Cuban episode.
H. THE FACTS
Sixty-eight Cubans arrived along the North Coast of Jamaica between January 27 and March 15, 1996. 9 The government accommodated the first arrivals at private residences
throughout Jamaica, while providing various public institutions
for housing to those who followed.' 0 The government is estimated to have incurred nearly $2,000,000, in expenses associated with supporting these Cuban refugees.'
Upon their arrival in Jamaica, the entire Cuban immigrant
population claimed refugee status. 12 The government responded
by directing their claims to an interministerial Eligibility Committee which was established to address refugee matters.1 The
Eligibility Committee consisted of civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Attorney General's Department, and
the Ministry of National Security and Justice. 14 On the basis of
the Eligibility Committee's conclusion that the Cubans were not
entitled to refugee status, the Jamaican government decided to
return them all to their homeland. 15

CONTESTING CASTRO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 24164 (1994); THOMAS G. PATERSON, MEETING THE COMMUNIST THREAT: TRUMAN TO REAGAN 191-

210(1988).
9. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 1. Sixty of these Cuban nationals formally consented to interviews by the government. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY
CommnrEE FOR REVIEWING THE INITIAL DECISION CONCERNING THE CUBAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS,
May 2, 1996, at 6 (on file with author) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMITTEE].

10. See REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 6. See also Sponsors of
Cubans Say Colour Didnt Matter, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 26,1996, at 8-9.
11. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1,at 2.
12. Id. See also Asylum Request Rejected Cubans to be Sent Home, JAMAICA OBSERVER,
Apr. 11, 1996, at 1; How They Were Turned Down, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 26, 1996, at 9; Michael Becker, CubansFlee to Puerto Rico JAMAICA OBSERVER, at 1.
13. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 2; REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY
COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 2-3.
14. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMITTEE, supranote 9, at 3.
15. Id. See also Michael Becker, Asylum Request Rejected Cubans to be Sent Home,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Apr. 11, 1996, at 1.
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This unpopular decision prompted the government to instruct the Eligibility Committee to take two weeks in order to
review the applications of all the Cuban asylum-seekers. 16 The
Committee subsequently denied refugee status to fifty-seven of
the sixty applicants, and deemed the status of the remaining
three inconclusive. 17 Pursuant to the Eligibility Committee's
findings, the government resolved to repatriate the fifty-seven
The remaining three applicants were given
Cuban nationals.'
authorization to remain in Jamaica. 19
After the government announced its decision, several of the
Cubans escaped from the Jamaican security forces. 20 Amid reports that some of these asylum-seekers fled Jamaica, 2 1 the government repatriated thirteen of the fifty-seven Cubans. 22 Jamaica and Cuba entered into an agreement articulating the plan
for the repatriation of the remaining forty-three Cubans. 23 Jamaican government officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding relating to24 the repatriation of future Cuban asylumseekers in Jamaica.
III. CARIBBEAN REFUGEES: THE GENERAL CONTEXT
This incident was not the first time Cuban nationals had
sought asylum in Jamaica. Jamaica's proximity to Cuba makes it
16. See, e.g., Government Backs Down: Cubans Have 7vo Weeks to Appeal Repatriation,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Apr. 12, 1996, at 1. The instructions to the reconstituted Eligibility Committee, established to review the applications, were announced on April 11, 1996, and the Committee was given two weeks to reconsider the asylum claims. Id.
17. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 4; REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY
COMMI'rEE, supra note 9, at 9. An Appendix to the Report of the Eligibility Committee, setting
out the Committee's assessment of the individual cases, has not been made public.
18. See also Cabinet to Review Cuban Asylum Appeals Monday, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May
9, 1996, at 1.
19. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supranote 1, at 4.
20. Powell, supra note 2, at 1.
21. Michael Becker, Cubans Flee to Puerto Rico,JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 3, 1996, at 1.
22. Id. See also Fve More CubansLocated, JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 10, 1996, at 5.
23. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 2.
24. The Memorandum of Understanding is not published, however for references to it, see
Cuba, JamaicaStrike Deal, JAMAICA HERALD, May 25, 1996, at 1; Agreement to Send Them
Back, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 26, 1996, at 1; JamaicaDevuelve Emigrantes legales de Origen
Cubano [Jamaica Returns Illegal Immigrates of Cuban Origin], GRANMA, May 22, 1996. For a
more extensive description of the government's attempts to explain the Memorandum of Understanding, see Agreement or Memorandum?, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 26,1996, at 1; NDM Slams
Muilings,JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 27, 1996; No Subterfiuge,JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 30,1996;
Cabinet Yet to See Cuba "Agreement," JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 4,1996, at 3.
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a likely destination for Cubans fleeing their country.2 5 On previous occasions, however, the attendant publicity and controversy
was absent.
One of the reasons for the heightened interest in the 1996
refugee episode is that it arose shortly after Cuban authorities
had shot down two small aircraft operated by members of the
Cuban-American organization Brothers to the Rescue (Hermanos
al Rescate) in February 1996. Immediately following this incident the U.S. government tightened its trade and investment
embargo against Cuba through the Helms-Burton Act 26 and influential U.S. politicians hardened their anti-Castro positions.
Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that Jamaica's decision to repatriate the Cuban refugees had significant political
ramifications. Although legal considerations may have motivated the decision, some commentators perceived Jamaica's action as a reflection of its foreign policy priorities. 27 The question,
therefore, became whether Jamaica would show strong support
for its Third World ally at a time when that ally was subject to
2
increasingly powerful hegemonic pressures.

25. Cuban Boatpeople Leave Ahead of Castro Crackdown, Reuters, Sept. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
26. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785(1996).
27. See, e.g., The Cuban Government's Promise, DAILY GLEANER, May 31, 1996; Cuban
Deportees, DAILY GLEANER, June 10, 1996; Stephen Vasciannie, Government by Fog, DAILY
GLEANER, June 3, 1996; If the Mfinister is Honourable,JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 25, 1996, at 6;
This Cuban Refugee Fasco,JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 22, 1996.
28. DONALD P. KOMMERS & GILBERT D. LOESCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN PoLIcY
133 (1989) (stating that refugee policy can be used 'to embarrass or destabilize enemy govern.
ments"). See LOESCHER, supra note 7, at 37. See also Ranee I L. Panjabi, The Global Refugee
Crisis. A Search for Solutions, 21 CAL. W. INT' L.. 247, 251 (1990); Mark Gibney & Michael
Stohl, Human Rights and US Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS?. CLOSED SOCIETIES? 172
(Mark Gibney ed., 1988). Clearly, some of the general support for the Cuban government is also
grounded in the developing countries' desire to reaffim their sovereignty and self determination
in a unipolar world. From this vantage point, the United States is sometimes perceived, at least,
as exhibiting overreaching tendencies. Thus, the following statement on Cuba by Alexander
Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter.American Affairs to The Wall Street JournalConference on the Americas in New York City on October 28, 1994, is perhaps more aspirational
than factual: "Inthe past, the Castro regime enjoyed a degree of tacit support--even encouragement-from many Latin American and Caribbean nations. These days are over." Alexander
Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Update on US Policy Toward
Cuba, 5 DISPATCH 45, 751 (Dept. of St. Bureau of Pub. Affairs, 1994). For discussion on Cuban
diplomacy in the Americas and the Third World prior to the end of the Cold War, see JORGE I.
DOMNGUEz, TO MAKE AWORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION: CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY 219-48 (1989).
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More generally, the controversy concerning the Cuban asylum-seekers was exacerbated by certain well-known, and yet almost obsolete, Cold War concerns. 9 The Cold War, in its most
30
pronounced and identifiable form, has receded into history
while the organic connections between Eastern European communism and Cuban society have been publicly severed.3 ' Nevertheless, within the Caribbean region, issues pertaining to Cuba
are often sharply divisive. Thus, the ultimate inquiry in the
case-whether refugee status should be granted to sixty asylumseekers-quickly drew concerns which, from a legal perspective,
were only tangentially related to the issue at hand. For example,
in the midst of the public discussions on the refugees, some suggested that opponents of the Jamaican government's final decision were actually supporting and sustaining the anti-Castro
contingency in south Florida.3 2 Regardless of their intent, supporters of the Cuban asylum-seekers were said to be conspiring
against Cuban sovereignty.33 Indeed, when a refugee question is
viewed as having such broad and contentious implications, it is
likely to generate a considerable amount of debate.

29. See, e.g., David Rieff, Cuba Refrozen, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 62 (1995); James Petras & Morris Morley, Clinton's Cuba Policy: Two Steps Backward, One Step Forward, 17 THIRD WORLD Q.
269 (1996); Antoni Kapda, Politics in Cuba. Beyond the Stereotypes, 15 BULL. LATIN Am REs.
247 (1996); Andrew Zimbalist, Dateline Cuba: Hanging on in Havana, 92 FOREIGN POLY 151
(1993). For a useful, though dated, review of the resilience of the Cuban regime, see Gifllian
Gunn, W'Zl Castro FaU?, 79 FOREIGN POL'Y 132 (1990).
30. There is extensive literature on the end of the Cold War. See genera!y 4 WARREN I.
COHEN, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 219-45 (1993); ERIC J.

HOBSBAwM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991 (1994), HENRY
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994). For analyses of some of the challenges to global order in the
Post-Cold War era, see ZBIGN]EW BRZEZINSKI, OUT OF CONTROL: GLOBAL TURMOIL ON THE EVE
OF THE 21ST CENTURY (1993);
31. See genera//y DOMINGUEZ, supra note 28; SUSAN EVA ECKSTEIN, BACK FROM THE
FUTURE: CUBA UNDER CASTRO (1994). Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, argues that prior to 1989, the level of economic assistance from the Soviet Union to Cuba amounted
to between four and six billion dollars, almost one-third of Cuba's gross domestic product at the
time. Peter Tarnof Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Cuban Refugees, 5 DISPATCH 35, 579
(Dept. of St. Bureau of Pub. Affairs, 1995).
32. On the political orientation of Cuban exiles in South Florida, see David Rieff, From
EziLes to Immigrants, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 76 (1995).
33. This position is supported in part by the fact that some Cuban-American groups in
Florida threatened to organize a boycott of Jamaica as a tourist destination following the Jamaican government's decision to repatriate the asylum-seekers. See Government Takes Cuban F,-ie
Threat Seriously, JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 20,1996, at 3. The National Democratic Movement
in Jamaica, though critical of the government's repatriation decision, opposed the threat from the
Cuban.American groups, describing it as "a misguided shot in the dark.' NDM Raps CubanAmerican Groups, JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 22,1996, at 3.
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Furthermore, interest in refugee matters was also stimulated by the unsteady course charted by the Clinton Administration in this area. 34 With respect to both Cubans and Haitians,
recent U.S. policy has been inconsistent. For instance, in September 1994, the United States eliminated its thirty-year policy
of welcoming all Cuban asylum-seekers as refugees. 35 The Clnton Administration has implemented measures which now require Cuban asylum-seekers to apply for United States access

pursuant to an Immigration Agreement, dated September 9,
1994. In turn, this agreement requires the United States to accept a minimum of 20,000 Cubans annually.36 This newly implemented system shows the potential for genuine refugees to be
denied access to the United States and suggests that political factors are given priority over legal considerations in the American
refugee determination process. 37 Similar concerns are also rele34. See generally Bill Frelick, Address at the 1995 Meeting of the Latin American Studies
Association, XIX Congress (Sept. 30, 1995), reprinted in U.S. COMMTrEE FOR REFUGEES, U.S.
REFUGEE POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN: NO BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS (1995).
35. See President Clinton, Cuban Refugees, 5 DISPATCH 35, 579 (Dept. of St. Bureau of
Pub. Affairs, 1994) (opening remarks at the August 19,1994 White House Press Conference). See
also Tarnoff, supranote 31, at 580. For a critical view of the pre-1994 United States policy of accepting all Cuban asylum-seekers, see Reason is on Our Side (President Castro on Cuban television and Radio Havana, Aug. 24, 1994). According to President Castro, in the period from January 1990 to August 1994, the United States admitted all 13,275 Cuban asylum-seekers who
arrived in the country. Id. See also Stephen Vasciannie, CaribbeanPoliticalRefugees, DAILY
GLEANER, Feb. 5,1996.
36. US.-CubaJoint Communique on Migration, 5 DISPATCH 37, 603 (Dept. of St. Bureau
of Pub. Affairs, 1994); Acting Secretary of Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, FY 1996 Refugee Admissions Programme, 6 DISPATCH 34, 643-44 (Dept. of St. Bureau of Pub. Affairs, 1995). The 1994
policy change was arguably part of a broader shift in American policy to take account of global
changes in the Post-Cold War period. Acting Secretary Tarnoff stated the concept in this manner:
Since the end of World War II, refugees resettled in the United States havein the main-been persons fleeing communism. In most cases, communism became synonymous with persecution. While we continue to admit members of
certain groups to whom commitments were made before the demise of most
communist States, we are in a period of transition which is resulting in adjustments of worldwide admissions over time.
Id. at 643.
37. As a result of the U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique an increased number of Cubans may
officially migrate to the United States annually. See US.-Cuban Joint Communique on Migration, supra note 36. In the years prior to the agreement, the U.S. Interests Section processed no
more than approximately 6000 people per annum, but, as noted in the text, the number is now
set at 20,000; the 'in-country refugee program' of the United States in Cuba is now designed to
process 7000 refugees per year, as opposed to a pre-1994 level of 3000. Tarnoff supra note 31, at
580.
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vant to the U.S. refugee policy on Haitians, for, at the very least,
the changes of policy concerning Haitians have been manifestly
political.38 The deep politicization of the Cuban and Haitian
refugee situations by the United States meant that when the
Cubans arrived in Jamaica and sought refuge, their presence
prompted broad discussion on the role of the United States in the
post-Cold War Caribbean.3 9
Another factor contributing to the attention paid to the 1996
Cuban refugee episode is that, since 1990, the question of refugees has gradually assumed greater prominence in Jamaica's
policy-making. A notable turning-point was the Jamaican government's decision in 1994, to allow U.S. immigration authorities
to use Jamaican territorial waters as a venue for American processing of Haitian asylum-seekers--a decision which made Jamaica an offshore base for the assessment of Haitian refugee
claims during the Cedras regime. 40 That decision, which was the
subject of criticism, sharpened Jamaican awareness of refugee
issues. 41 At the same time, the United States processing of Haitian refugees in Jamaican territorial waters was part of a general trend: owing to the prevailing circumstances in Haiti following the ouster of President Aristide, the steady stream of
38. See Karen Musalo, Beating a Hasty Retreat, 5 PEACE REV. 3, 293 (1993). Eckstein reminds us that in 1992 and 1993, the U.S. government warmly received Cuban balseros, while
simultaneously turning away Haitian boat people. Given the clear possibility of political persecution in Haiti during the Cedras period, this approach appeared unjustifiable. Government
Takes Cuba Exile Threat Seriously,supra note 33.
39. Government Barks Down, supra note 16, at 1.
40. Memorandum concerning the Siting of Refugee Processing Ships in Jamaican Territorial Waters, 1994, U.S-Jamaica (on file with author). For the official United States position conceraing the use of third states and vessels outside the United States for refugee-processing, see
Statement by President Clinton, U.S. Taking New Steps to Respond to Crisis in Haiti, 5
DISPATCH 21, 325-26 (Dept. of St. Bureau of Pub. Affairs, 1994). See also Address to an Ad Hoc
Meeting of Organizationof American States Foreign Ministers,5 DISPATCH 24, at 384 (Dept. of
St. Bureau of Pub. Affairs, 1994); US. Policy Toward Haiti, HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere and Peace CorpsAffairs of the Senate ForeignRelations Comm., 103d Cong.
2d Sess., 96 (1994) (statement of Brunson McKinley, Acting Director of the Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, Department of State) reprinted in 5 DISPATCH 28, at 468 (Dept. of St.
Bureau of Pub. Affairs, 1994).
41. See, e.g., Golding Queries Processingof HaitiansHere, DAILY GLEANER, June 17, 1994,
at 3; Reginald Allen, Jamaica Not Accepting Haitians, DAILY GLEANER, June 21, 1994; Goof
Brown, Processing of HaitianRefugees, DAILY GLEANER, June 19, 1994; That HaitianMatter,
DAILY GLEANER, June 17,1994; OppressiveRegime Pushing HaitiansOut, DAILY GLEANER, July
1, 1994; ProcessingAborted 'Comfort'Stop Taking Haitians, DAILY GLEANER, July 7, 1994; JLP
Pleased at End to Processingof Haitians, JAMAICA HERALD, July 8, 1994; 'Comfort's' Last Haitians to Get Asylum Hearings, DAILY GLEANER, July 13, 1994; 'Comfort' Sails Today, DAILY
GLEANER, July 17,1994.
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refugees from that country primarily to the United States, 42 but
also to Jamaica and other regional destinations, placed refugee
issues on the Caribbean agenda. For these reasons, sensitivity to
refugee concerns grew in certain sectors of Jamaican society by
the time the sixty Cubans arrived.
Several events in Jamaica also helped to stir public controversy surrounding the 1996 Cuban refugee episode. For example, the Jamaican government had allowed the Cuban applications to accumulate before it established the procedural
mechanisms for review. Thus, the number of applications increased from sixteen to sixty-eight between January and March
of 1996. 43 As the numbers grew, public curiosity and concern
also increased. 44 Similarly, with the passing of time, a growing
number of Jamaicans came into personal contact with Cuban
asylum-seekers which prompted some Jamaicans to lend public
support to the Cubans.

42. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES 1993: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 42 (1993). Morris notes that the route from

Haiti to the United States is by far the longest of any of the major, unregulated, migratory routes
by sea. MICHAEL A. MORRIS, CARIBBEAN MARITIME SECURITY 95 (1994). See generally Bill Frelick, Closing Ranka The North Locks Arms Against New Refugees, in ALTERED STATES: A
READER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 162 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabeck eds., 1993).

There is substantial legal literature on recent decisions by the United States to return Haitian
asylum-seekers to their homeland. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refaulement and
Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INTL LJ.94 (1994); Thomas Davis Jones, The HaitianRefugee Crisi. A Quest for Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INTL L 77 (1993); N. DeWayne Pope, The
Closing ofAmerica's "Golden Door" The HaitianRefugee Cases, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 687 (1992-93).
For a noteworthy U.S. case, see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). On the
treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers in the pre-Aristide period, see JAKE C. MILLER, THE PLIGHT
OF HAITIAN REFUGEES (1984); Josh DeWind, Alien Justice: The Exclusion of HaitianRefugees, 46
J. SOC. ISSUES 121 (1990).
43. Government sources indicate that the Cuban asylum-seekers who arrived in Jamaica
between January 27 and March 15, 1996, did so in the following numbers:
Date
Numbers
January 27, 1996
16
February 11, 1996
12
February 21, 1996
13
February 23,1996
10
March 8, 1996
15
March 15, 1996
2
Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 1.
44. Public curiosity and concern grew with the increasing media coverage of the arrivals
and of the government's perspective. See, e.g., supra notes 2 and 24. In May and June 1996, issues concerning the Cuban asylum-seekers were also the subject of extensive discussion on various popular talk-shows on television and radio in Jamaica.
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This support was countered by those who maintained that
the Jamaicans offered Cuban asylum-seekers preferential treatment on the grounds of race. The argument was that, in contrast
to Haitians, 45 the Jamaicans gave the Cubans certain material
comforts and benefits 46 for reasons of race, rather than humanitarian or legal reasons.4 7 Regardless of whether this accusation
was well-founded, it proved persuasive to some Jamaicans. Consequently, the incident of the Cuban asylum-seekers became a
part of the long-standing discourse on race and racial attitudes
within Jamaican society. 48 Again, the effect of this development
was to focus considerable public attention on the Cubans.
In view of these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that
partisan political influences increased the level of heated discourse. As suggested, both opposition parties in the country, together with the government, vigorously debated various aspects
of refugee policy at the time of the final decision to repatriate the
Cubans. To the extent of introducing the Jamaican public to national and international approaches to refugees, the debate
proved to be enlightening. On the other hand, given the nature
of partisan political discourse, it was inevitable that the debate
was also misleading in some respects. Some party positions
erred on the side of oversimplification, reducing difficult ques-

45. See. e.g., Haitians Must Go, DAILY GLEANER, June 15, 1992, at 1 (stating residents of
' Montpelier, Jamaica protested because their social activities were inconvenienced by the presence of Haitian asylum-seekers at the local community center).
46. For references to this aspect of the Cuban episode, see John Maxwell, We Can Change
Things in the Ghettoes, We Really Ca,,JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 3, 1996; Sponsors of Cubans
Say Colour Didn%Matter, JAMAICA OBSERVER, May 26, 1996; Stephen Vasciannie, Cuban vs.
Haitian Refugees, JAMAICA OBSERVER, July 9,1996; Stephen Vasciannie, The Refugee Confusion,
DAILY GLEANER, May 26,1996.
47. Stephen Vascianme, The Refugee Confusion, DAILY GLEANER, May 26,1996.
48. See generally Ernle P. Gordon, Race, Claw and Social Mobility, in GARVEY: HIS WORK
AND IMPACT 265 (Rupert Lewis & Patrick Bryan eds., 1988); Trevor Munroe, The Left and the
Question of Race, in GARVEY: HIS WORK AND IMPACT 283 (Rupert Lewis & Patrick Bryan eds.,
1988); Carl Stone, Race and Economic Power in Jamaic, in GARVEY: HIS WORK AND IMPACT 243
(Rupert Lewis & Patrick Bryan eds., 1988); H. Hoetink, "Race" and Color in the Caribbean, in
CARIBBEAN CONTOURS 55 (Sidney W. Mintz & Sally Price ads., 1985); C. L. R. JAMES, AT THE
RENDEZVOUS OF VICTORY: SELECTED WRITINGS 218 (1984); M. G. SMITH, CULTURE, RACE AND
CLASS IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 61.87 (1984); NORMAN GIRVAN, ASPECTS OF THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE IN THE CARIBBEAN AND IN THE AMERICAS (Institute of Social and
Economic Research, Univ. of W. Indies, Working Paper 7 (1975)); AGGREY BROWN, COLOR, CLASS
AND POLITICS IN JAMAICA (1979); DAVID LOWENTHAL, WEST INDIAN SOCIETIES 250-92 (1972);
REX M. NETrLEFORD, MIRROR, MIRROR: IDENTITY, RACE AND PROTEST IN JAMAICA (1970);

GORDON K LEWIS, THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN WEST INDIES 15-94 (1968); M. G. SMITH, THE
PLURAL SOCIETY IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES 1-18 (1965).
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tions to broad platitudes.4 9 In addition, there was a marked and
almost understandable tendency for party spokespersons to focus
on broad political concerns regarding the final decision. In practical terms, this meant that partisan discourse sometimes ignored the legal aspects of the decision, and, in particular, the
relevant provisions of the 1951 Refugees Convention 5°
(Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating thereto. 51
IV. IDENTIFYING REFUGEES
A.

The Official Approach

The Cuban asylum-seekers claimed that, as a matter of law,
they were "refugees."5 2 They further claimed that they were entitled to remain in Jamaica pursuant to the principle of nonrefoulement, 53 which provides that political offenders should not
49. For instance, at a Press Conference on April 11, 1996, the Minister of National Security
and Justice insisted that "[tlhe government cannot allow itself to become impotent because a few
persons say they intend to violate the laws. Government must act, and in so doing we will ensure
that all human rights measures are observed." Government Backs Down, supra note 16, at 1. At
the same conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that foreign policy was often very
sensitive, and added "[tihis is why I feel a sense of disappointment at those who have sought to
make cheap political capital out of what has happened." Id.
50. Convention Relating to the Statuts of Refugees, July 28, 1961, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter Refugees Convention]. The Convention entered into force on April 22, 1954, and as
of December 31, 1995, there were 126 parties. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December 1995, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/14, at 218 (1996)
[hereinafter Multilateral Treaties 1995].
51. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The Protocol entered into force on October 4, 1967, and as of December 31, 1995, there were 126 parties. Multilateral Treaties 1995, supra note 50, at 240.
52. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 2; REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY
COMMITrEE, 8upra note 9, at 3.
53. See Refugees Convention, supra note 50, at 176, art. 33(1). For a discussion of the
early legal support of non-refoulement, see UNHCR, COLLECTED PROCEEDINGS, supra 4, at 5. As
a clear treaty rule, non-refoulement made its first appearance in Article 3(2) of the Convention
relating to the International Status of Refugees of October 28, 1933. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN,
TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 40 (1980). For a further explanation of non-refoulement, see UNHCR,
COLLECTED PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 20. Bearing in mind the authoritative pronouncements of the International Court ofJustice in The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) on
when a treaty rule passes into the corpus of customary law, a strong case can be made that the
principle of non-refoulement, as set out in the Refugees Convention, has achieved customary
status. See also Lee Bun v. Director of Immigration 92 I.L. 651, 655 (H.K 1990). For the view
that the principle of non-refoulement was not part of customary law in the years immediately
following the entry into force of the Refugees Convention, see ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 41 (1980). Cf Paul Weis, Legal Aspects of the Convention of 25 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT LL. 478, 482-83 (1953); GUY S. GOODWiN-GiLL,
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be extradited but instead are entitled to remain in the receiving
state. The Jamaican government did not challenge this second
aspect of the Cubans' claim. 54 Instead, the government based its
decision to repatriate the Cubans on the ground that they were
not really refugees. According to the government, the Cubans
were "economic refugees,"5 5 or even "illegal aliens,"5 but clearly
not "refugees."
In assessing the validity of these competing views, the core
issue for analysis is whether any of the Cuban asylum-seekers
satisfied the internationally accepted definition of refugees.5 7
The answer to this question depends on interpretation of the
terms of the 1951 Refugees Convention and the 1967 Protocol to
which Jamaica is party.5
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 141 (1978).
54. The government did not expressly oppose the principle of non-refoulement. Still, it did
not elaborate on the international obligations arising under the 1951 Refugees Convention and
its 1967 Protocol. See, e.g., Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supranote 1, at 2.
55. Government Backs Down, supranote 16, at 1.
56. Id.
57. There has been debate among international lawyers on whether the act of recognizing
that a person has satisfied the definition of refugee in the Convention is a constitutive or merely
a declaratory act. The wording of Article I(A)(1) suggests that the latter view is preferable, since
it merely requires the refugee-determining agency to declare that the applicant satisfies the
definition. If the applicant satisfies the definition, he or she is ipso facto entitled to remain in the
receiving state. Refugees Convention, supranote 50, at 152. See also Gilbert Jaegar, Status and
InternationalProtectionof Refugees (INTER. INSTIT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 9th Seas., July 1978)
(supporting the declaratory approach on prudential grounds). The Dutch Supreme Court has
acknowledged the right of non-refoulement even for persons who do not fall within the Convention definition of refugees. See Netherlands v. FV 99 I.LI. 32 (Neth. 1988) (noting that the court
applied the principle of non-refoulernent to protect a Sri Lankan national when it found the Sri
Lankan to be "objectively in a state of flight"). Id. at 33.
58. Jamaica became a party to the 1951 Refugees Convention, by succession, on July 30,
1964, and acceded to the 1967 Protocol on October 30, 1980. Multilateral Treaties 1995, supra
note 50, at 240. Cuba is not a party to either the 1951 Refugees Convention or the 1967 Protocol.
This point is of little significance for the purposes of this Article. The main issue for consideration
concerns Jamaica's obligations under the Refugees Convention and 1967 Protocol, not Cuba's
political rights or duties. Of course, there have been recent attempts to broaden the scope of
refugee policy by concentrating greater attention on the international responsibility of the states
from which refugees originate. Such attempts may ultimately help curtail refugee flows across
borders, and inasmuch as they incorporate concepts from the traditional law of state responsibility and from human rights law, they have a sound legal basis. Nevertheless, refugee law, as currently configured, still focuses primarily on the legal duties of the receiving state. See generally
Sadsko Ogata, Keynote Address to the Colloquium organized by the GraduateInstitute of InternationalStudies in Collaborationwith the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, in THE
PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES at xix
(Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996); Christian Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Country of
Origin, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
ISSUES 59 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996); GERVASE COLES, STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN
RELATION To THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE STATE OF ORIGIN
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Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugees Convention 59 defines a refugee
as a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country. 0
Consequently, the basic legal question put before the Eligibility Committee was whether any particular Cuban could establish that he or she had a well-founded fear that upon return
to Cuba he or she would be subject to either political persecution
or persecution on any of the other grounds enunciated in the
Refugees Convention.6 1 The Eligibility Committee firmly answered this question3 in the negative, 62 and the government ac6
cepted this answer.
The Eligibility Committee's approach was to concentrate on
the individual status of each applicant.6 4 Thus, the Eligibility
Committee sought to ascertain why each applicant had left
Cuba. 65 Details concerning individual responses have not been
made public, but the Eligibility Committee has released a general description of responses.

4-8 (1993); Frelick, supra note 7.
59. The Refugees Convention restricts the definition of "refugees' expressly to events occurring before January 1, 1951, while the 1967 Protocol expressly removes this restriction to include events since that date.
60. For further discussion of the definition of the term 'refugee," see Jaeger, supra note 57,
at 12; GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 1-46; UNHOR, COLLECTED PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4,
at 72, 83; J.G. Starke, Refugee Status Under International Law, 64 AUSTL. L.J. 88 (1990).
61. As various commentators have noted, the definition in the Refugees Convention does
not fully cover the different categories of refugees that have arisen since 1967. Nonetheless, this
is the provision which served as the applicable law for Jamaica in the Cuban episode. See Multilateral Treaties 1995, supra note 50, at 240.
62. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMM=IIEE, supra note 9, at 9.
63. The government never explained why three of the sixty asylum-seekers were allowed
to remain in Jamaica. On this point, the Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs notes that
the Eligibility Committee did not reach a conclusion in those three applicants' cases. Statement
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, aupranote 1, at 6,
64. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMrEE, supra note 9, at 6-9.
65. Id. at 6. The emphasis the Committee placed on why the applicants left Cuba originally may have been misplaced. The central question ought to have been why the applicants
were unwilling to return to Cuba.
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The applicants identified the following factors as the basis
for their decision to leave Cuba: restrictions on freedoms of
movement and speech; religious discrimination resulting in denial of opportunity for higher education or professional training;
economic difficulties; and a preference for Jamaica and the Jamaican system of government.6 In some cases, applicants complained that they, were subject to state surveillance, home
searches, detention for suspicious activities, and harassment by
frequent interrogation. 67 These claims did not persuade the Eligibility Committee, which declared that the conduct complained
of did not amount to persecution, especially in cases where there
are no recent incidents to support the claims. 66
B.

Critique

1. Individual Claims
There are at least two basic flaws in the Eligibility Committee's reasoning. First, given the degree of public interest surrounding the issue, the Eligibility Committee should have publicly disclosed the case presented by each of the applicants. Not
only would this have been consistent with the Eligibility Committee's own claim that emphasis should be placed on the individuals seeking refugee status, but it would have also allowed interested persons the opportunity to assess the decision of the
Eligibility Committee in each particular case. Instead, the
Committee created a vacuum by establishing general principles
to guide the review of the Cuban's claims, but neglecting to detail
the application of these principles. This practice limits the jurisprudential value of the Eligibility Committee's decision because
66. Id. at 7-8.
67. Id.
68. A nild criticism of the Eligibility Committee's approach here is that the Committee did

not elaborate on the relationship between past persecution and the existence of a "well-founded
fear of persecution.' Indeed, if incidents of persecuted refugee applicants are confined to the distant past, then this may suggest that future persecution is unlikely. However, this can be no
more than a presumption, for in each case one needs to examine why the applicant had been free

of persecution for the tma period in question. The Committee does not seem to have considered,
for instance, that changing conditions in Cuba may have led to stricter monitoring of political
dissidents in recent years, and that this could have caused an increasing perception of persecution among some applicants. On the nature of time as a factor in determining persecution, see I
GRAHL-MADSEN, supro note 4, at 176-77.
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it remains uncertain how the Committee will apply its established principles in future refugee cases.
Specifically, the Eligibility Committee's decision provides little, if any, guidance on how it will apply the concept of a "wellfounded fear of persecution" in future refugee applications. Indeed, fear is a subjective condition, a state of mind which may
vary by individual. However, as Atle Grahl-Madsen argues, the
notion of a "well-founded fear" is a technical term which suggests
that those examining refugee claims should apply an objective
standard,6 9 so that "the nervous, the70 brave, and the foolhardy
should be subject to the same gauge."
If this is so, then the issue becomes whether the objective
standard that the Eligibility Committee applied in determining if
each Cuban applicant had a well-founded fear is that of the general "reasonable person," of the "reasonable Jamaican who has
no first-hand knowledge of conditions in Cuba," or of the
"reasonable Cuban." The decision to repatriate the Cuban applicants may have turned on which of those three standards the
Committee used in determining what constituted a well-founded
fear in this particular case. Without any clear indication by the
Eligibility Committee concerning the actual standard used, it is
difficult to draw conclusions about the validity of the Committee's decision.
Notably, a central objective of the refugee determination
process is the need to protect refugees. 71 Awareness of this objective should prompt authorities in the receiving state to adopt a
liberal approach in applying the criteria set out in the Convention for the identification of refugees. 72 The Eligibility Committee appears to have accepted this proposition, evidenced by the
69. Id. at 177. Hence, the issue has both subjective and objective components. See also
UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supranote 4, at 12; Patricia Hyndman, Refugees Under InternationalLaw
with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 148, 149 (1986); STARKE, supra note 60,

at 88-89 (noting Chan Yee Kin v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 90 I.L.R. 138
(Austl. 1989)); Rajudeen v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 92 I.L.R. 662 (Can. 1984).
70. 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 4, at 174.
71. Refugees Convention, supra note 50, at 150-51. The Refugees Convention's preamble

provides that "the United Nations has, on various occasions manifested its profound concern for
refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of...

fundamental

rights and freedoms." Id. at 150. Likewise, the preamble also notes that the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees 'is charged with the task of supervising international conven-

tions providing for the protection of refugees.' Id.at 152.
72. GOODWIN-GILL, supranote 4, at 22.
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reference in its report that most of the Cuban applicants were
not eligible for refugee status "even on a liberal interpretation of
the Convention."73 Again, however, the analysis presented by
the Committee is deficient; the stated intention is to be liberal,
but there is no discussion as to what constitutes a liberal interpretation in the present context.
Unresolved issues surrounding the application of a liberal interpretation include the standard of proof utilized, and the factors influencing the standard of proof applied in each case. In accordance with applicable Jamaican common law principles, the
Committee might have required each claimant to establish his
case either "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "on a balance of probability." It would be within the Committee's discretion to reject
such standards because, as Guy S. Goodwin-Gill notes, they
usually refer to the situation in which a judicial body seeks to ascertain whether a proximate relationship exists between past
causes and past consequences. 7 4 In the case of the refugee
claimant, past causes have to be used to determine-or to foresee-possible consequences. With this in mind, the Eligibility
Committee could have applied standards such as whether there
was a "reasonable chance" of persecution, whether there were
"substantial grounds for believing" that there would be persecution, or whether there was "a serious possibility" of persecution. 75
Unfortunately, the Committee was silent on this point.
2. Apprehensions Concerning the Cuban Government's
Reaction
The second basic problem with the Eligibility Committee's
approach is that the assumptions upon which the final decision is
based contradict the political reality in Cuba. It is widely ac-

73. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMITrEE, supra note 9, at 9.
74. GOODWIN-GILL, aupra note 4, at 23. See also Fernandez v. Government of Singapore

[1971] 1 W.LJ 987,993-94.
75. GOODWIN-GnIj, aupra note 4, at 24 (suggesting these possible standards); See 1
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 4, at 175 (suggesting that the standard is whether it is "likely' that
the person concerned will become a victim of persecution). Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421 (1987) (adopting a 'reasonable possibility' test) with Regina v. Secretary of State for
the Home Dep't, Ex parte Sivakumaran, 1988 A-C. 958 (assuming the 'reasonable likelihood"
standard by the English House of Lords). See Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Af-

fairs, 63 AUSTL. LJ. 561 (1989) (favoring a 'substantial chance' of persecution test); See also
Starke, 8upra note 60, at 89.
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knowledged that the Cuban regime has detained numerous persons as political prisoners. 76 In the month preceding the Eligibility Committee decision, the United Nations Human Rights
Commission issued a report stating that "hundreds" of Cubans
were imprisoned for their political views. 77 In the report, a special United Nations investigator also stated that "hundreds" of
Cubans were harassed or dismissed from their jobs for political
reasons, and noted "violations of freedom of expression, information, travel, assembly and peaceful demonstration."78 The special
investigator estimated that some 1500 prisoners in Cuba were
political detainees during the period shortly before the Jamaican
government's decision to return the asylum-seekers. 79 There
may be differences of opinion concerning the number of political
detainees in Cuba, but the Cuban authorities concede the fact
that they sometimes arrest persons for purely political offenses.8s
It is also a matter of record that the Cuban regime is embarrassed whenever Cuban nationals flee the country in unauthorized boats.81 The reasons for this embarrassment are easily un76. For the official U.S. perspective on this issue, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FROM 1995: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS U.S. HousE oF REPRESENTATVES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS U.S. SENATE 384,447 (1996).
77. UN Blasts Cuba'sRights Record, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Apr. 22,1996, at 1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The Cuban Constitution stipulates that citizens may not exercise their legally recognized freedoms in a manner which is contrary to the 'existence and objectives of the socialist
state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism,' CUBAN
CONST., art. 62. Article 53 of the Cuban Constitution gives citizens "freedom of speech and of the
press in keeping with the objectives of socialist society.' Id. art. 53. Article 54 states that "while
the State recognizes, respects and guarantees the liberty of religion it also recognizes, respects,
and guarantees the liberty of every citizen to change religious beliefs or to have no beliefs, and to
state, within the boundaries of the law, their own religious preferences." Id. art. 54. See also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 76, at 383-87; The Breakfast Club (Interview with Ricardo
Alarcon DeQuesada, President of the Cuban National Assembly of People Power on Jamaica
Radio, Sept. 22, 1995) (Transcript on file with author) (admitting that there are political prisoners
in Cuba).
81. Naturally, this is not the stated position of the Cuban authorities. The official position
is that asylum-seekers leave Cuba because of the economic hardships faced by Cuban nationals
mainly as a result of the U.S. embargo. See infra note 100. In the recent past, the Cuban
authorities have also argued that American encouragement has stimulated emigration through
unofficial channels. See, e.g., Reason is on Our Side, supra note 35, at 21-22, 29, 41. For instance,
a Cuban government memorandum indicates that "[tihe attitude adopted by the United States in
admitting and facilitating the entering into its territory of Cubans who arrive illegally, even
when, in many cases, these are people with criminal records and deplorable criminal behavior
who normally would be denied entry via normal legal channels, has the direct consequence of
encouraging illegal emigration.' Cuban Government's Memorandum 1121,29 (Nov. 12, 1993) (on
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derstood: one who mounts a small, flimsy raft and faces the high
seas under the cloak of nightfall in order to leave one's homeland
is making a strong negative statement about conditions at
home.812 In the context of the vestigial Cold War relations between Cuba and the United States, such departures may well be
used for purposes of political persuasion by adversaries of the
Cuban regime. Accordingly, the Cuban government is consistent
in its desire to limit the outflow of unauthorized asylum-seekers.
For example, in the period preceding the Immigration Agreement
of 1994 between Cuba and the United States, President Castro
openly opposed the prevailing U.S. policy of accepting Cuban
asylum-seekers as political refugees.8 3
Upon reconciling these two facts-the prospect of imprisonment in Cuba for political reasons and the Cuban regime's disapproval of clandestine departures-the second weakness of the
Eligibility Committee's approach becomes apparent. In particular, the Committee, in assessing the Cuban claims for refugee
status, has underestimated the possibility that the Cuban asylum-seekers in Jamaica would be open to political persecution in
Cuba solely on the ground that they embarrassed the regime by
leaving the country without authorization.8 4 The argument is
not that persecution for unauthorized departure is inevitable,
but, rather, it is that the claimants could have had a "wellfounded fear of persecution," based on their recognition of the
Cuban authorities' attitude toward unauthorized asylumseekers.85

file with author).
82. For the view that refugees may embarrass their home country by 'voting with their
feet,* see Panjabi, supranote 28, at 249-50. See also UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 6,
at 245. "Refugees are in many ways a symbol of failure. No state likes to admit that its citizens
have felt obliged to leave their own country. Similarly, returnees are a symbol of success." Id

83. The Cuban President expressed his willingness to encourage the departure of various
social deviants from Cuba if the United States did not modify its policy of unquestioning accep-

tance of Cuban asylum-seekers. At the time of the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, it was widely believed
that a significant proportion of the Marie/itos were also deviants. B. E. Aguirre, Cuban Mas M
grationand the Social Constructionof Deuianta, 13 BULL. LATIN An RES. 155 (1994). For more
information on the Mariel Boatlift, see FELIX ROBERTO MASUD-PLOTO, WITH OPEN ARMS:
CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 71-110 (1988).

84. Sylvina dos Santos, the Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica, has challenged this view. In
an interview on Jamaican television, Ambassador dos Santos argued that '[it
is absolutely false
that they will suffer any harassment or violation of their human rights," and added that sugges.
tions to that effect were "anti-Cuba propaganda.' Government Backs Down, supra note 16, at 1

(citing Television Interview with Sylvina dos Santos, Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica, Thwaits
and Company (Apr. 11, 1996)).
85. In this regard, reference may also be made to occasional reports that some Cubans who
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In fairness, the Eligibility Committee was not unaware of
this claim. The Committee reports that some of the claimants
mentioned the fear of "conviction and sentence of imprisonment
6
for illegally leaving" as a part of their case for refugee status.8
The Committee's response on this point requires careful scrutiny.
It reads:
[The Cubans'] apprehension of conviction and sentence of imprisonment for illegally emigrating, though not relevant to the
determination of whether or not an applicant is a refugee,
ought not to be ignored. The apprehension of a sentence of
imprisonment of long duration is understandably bona fide.
We have been advised, based upon previous diplomatic talks
between the respective Governments, that the Government of
Cuba would be willing to give an undertaking not to prosecute or punish the returnees merely for leaving the country
without permission. Having regard to the good relations existing between the two Governments, we must presume that
the Cuban Government will honour such an undertaking.
Whether or not an amnesty will be extended to other collatpresent, is eminently a
eral or incidental offenses, past or
87
matter for the Cuban Government.
The foregoing statement raises at least two issues of general
importance. First, the Committee posits, almost ex cathedra,
that apprehension concerning illegal departure is irrelevant in
the refugee determination process.88 This is not convincing. One
might wonder why this apprehension is not relevant.8 9 Indeed,
prosecution per se is not the same as persecution; but, in some
circumstances, prosecution is the most obvious way in which perwere repatriated from the United States in 1995 have been subject to retaliation in Cuba. The
Cuban government has consistently rejected suggestions to this effect. See, e.g., Returned Refit-

gees Say Cub%Defying Pact, Retaliates,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at 1. See also Cubans Flee to
PuertoRico, JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 3, 1996, at 1. Cf. Tarnoff, supra note 31, at 580 (referring

to the U.S.-Cuba Joint Commiuniqu6 on Migration, September 9, 1994, Tarnoff noted that, as of
May 1995, the United States had 'no evidence that violence or coercion have been used to deter

[unauthorized] departures or that those attempting to leave the country using irregular means
have been persecuted or discriminated against.').
86. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY CO1MOrTEE, supranote 9, at 7-8.
87. Id. (emphasis added).

88. Id.
89. The discussion in the text does not dwell on what appears to be a logical fallacy in the
Eligibility Committee's approach. One may question how the Committee supports its position
that apprehension of arrest is irrelevant while maintaining that apprehension ought not to be

ignored. If apprehension of arrest is irrelevant, then, by definition, it ought to be ignored.
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secution manifests itself. Accordingly, apprehension of arrest for
illegal departure must be a relevant factor in determining
whether one is a refugee. Prosecution for illegal departure could
easily constitute the pretext for an arrest, where the real reason
for the arrest lies in the fact that the asylum-seeker has embarrassed the regime politically by fleeing the country. 90
Second, the Eligibility Committee appears to have attached
considerable significance to the Cuban authorities' assurance
that they would not prosecute or punish the returnees merely for
leaving Cuba without permission.9 ' The Committee's apparently
unquestioning acceptance of this assurance borders on the quixotic. 92 Without undue cynicism, one could argue that the Cuban
authorities had every reason to give assurance. The Cuban
authorities wished to have their nationals returned home, and
would have been embarrassed if the Jamaican government gave
such nationals refugee status. It was, therefore, in Cuba's interest to give this assurance. Arguably, however, the assurance
may be of limited value, especially considering that neither the
Jamaican government nor the Eligibility Committee is in a position to monitor effectively the situation of the Cuban asylumseekers once they are back in Cuba.
Furthermore, having relied on Cuba's assurance of nonprosecution, the Eligibility Committee appears to have simultaneously left open the possibility of prosecution. For, as the passage quoted above indicates, the Committee contemplated the
possibility that the Cuban government could prosecute the asylum-seekers for "collateral or incidental offenses, past or pres-

90. For general comments on the relationship between prosecution and persecution, see
UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 15-16; 1 GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 4, at 192.

91. The Jamaican government also placed reliance on assurances of the Cuban government. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 3; Government Backs Down, supra
note 16, at 1. Similar assurances were given by the Cuban authorities to the U.S. government at
the time of the U.S.-Cuba Joint Communiqu6 on Migration, September 9, 1994, and prior to the
conclusion of a Migration Agreement of May 2, 1995 between both countries concerning asylumseekers located at Guantanamo Bay. Tarnoff, supra note 31, at 580.
92. It is significant that, with respect to both the U.S.-Cuba Joint Communiqu6 on Migration, September 9,1994, and the Migration Agreement of May 2, 1995, the U.S. authorities maintained that they be allowed to verify for themselves that persons who left Cuba in unauthorized
vessels were not subject to threats or penalties upon return, and the Cuban government allowed
such verification. Under the latter agreement, in the period between May 2 and May 22, 1995,
the United States protested about two possible incidents (from a group of eleven persons returned to Cuba) in which 'it appeared possible that returnees were being disadvantaged by their
effort to leave Cuba illegally.' Tarnoff, supra note 31, at 580.
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ent."93 Given that the Cuban judiciary is known not to be independent of the executive, 94 and recalling that the departure of
the asylum-seekers from Cuba was an embarrassment to the
state, it is reasonable to believe that if the Cuban authorities
decided to prosecute the asylum-seekers, they could well identify
a number of offenses "collateral or incidental" to the offense of
leaving the country without permission. If this is so, then a Cuban asylum-seeker may justifiably have had a well-founded fear
of persecution, notwithstanding the Cuban government's assurance.
Finally, the approach recommended in this section is not entirely without precedent. Within Cold War Europe, certain Eastern Bloc States placed travel restrictions on their citizens and
imposed heavy penalties upon nationals for remaining outside
the country beyond the time contemplated in exit permits.9 5 In
this context, there was a division of opinion among receiving
states as to whether nationals who had departed the Eastern
Bloc State without a permit, or had violated the permit, were
ipso facto refugees. 96 According to some, if refugee status were
granted in such circumstances, this would prompt an influx of
bogus refugee claims. The other view, however, claims that restrictive exit rules were meant to bolster political authority in
the Eastern Bloc States, and that those departing from such
states could justifiably have a well-founded fear of persecution on
the basis that they had violated the country's travel rules. The
latter view, which received support in the courts of Austria and
the Federal Republic of Germany, is similar to the argument
97
proffered here.

93. REPORT OF THE ELIBIIT=CouTrEE, supra note 9, at 8.
94. The Cuban Constitution provides for independent courts, but it subordinates the courts
to the National Assembly and the Council of State, which is headed by President Castro. See
CUBAN CONST., arts. 5, 68,73,74,86, 89i), 122, 123(0, 123(g), 125. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, supra note 76, at 380, 383.
95. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 3133.
96. Id
97. In this connection, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill cites a Directive of the Austrian Minister of the
Interior, which expressly provides for recognition of refugee status where penal sanctions would
be applied to individuals who violate the terms of their exit permits by overstaying in a foreign
country, and where such individuals are unwilling to return home for political reasons.
GOODWIN-GILL supra note 4, at 32.
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V. CONCERNING ECONOMIC REFUGEES

The Jamaican government maintained that the Cuban asylum-seekers were, in fact, economic refugees and, therefore, did
not satisfy the definition of "refugees" set forth in the Refugees
Convention. 9 The argument was that Cubans who left Cuba for
economic, rather than political, reasons were not entitled to remain in Jamaica as a matter of law. 99
On preliminary examination, this perspective has some
merit. Given the discontinuation of Soviet and Eastern Bloc assistance to Cuba and the stifling effects of the American embargo, it is undeniable that economic conditions in Cuba have deteriorated in recent years. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude
that some of the Cuban asylum-seekers fled their country because they suffered under, or were dissatisfied with, Cuba's economic conditions. This view is confirmed by the responses which
some of the applicants made to the Eligibility Committee.
On the other hand, the fact that some, if not all, the Cuban
asylum-seekers may originally have left Cuba for economic reasons does not necessarily resolve the issue of their status as refugees. Assuming that the many of the Cubans were economic
refugees simpliciter at the time of their departure,'00 they may
98. See supratext accompanying notes 52-56.
99. Under the /ex/ata,it is undeniable that so-called economic refugees are not entitled to
the right of asylum. There are circumstances in which it will be almost impossible to draw a real
distinction between the terms 'refugee," as used in the Refugees Convention, and 'economic
refugee." See Maluwa, supranote 7 at 663 (arguing the distinction is often used as an opportunistic device to mask the political biases of the receiving country). See also ALAN DoWrY, CLOSED
BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 183 (1987). Nevertheless,

in the present discussion, it is assumed that the distinction can validly be made in most circumstances. Suggestions to modify the definition of refugee" in the Refugees Convention to embrace
economic refugees have encountered a range of social and economic objections which fall beyond
the scope of this Article. For a more thorough treatment of this issue, see J. H. Crabb, The Low of
Asylum For Refigees and Mass Movements of Populations,in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ROUNDTABLE ON SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS OF REFUGEE LAW 45,47 (May
11, 1978).

100. The general perspective of the Cuban government is that the departure of its nationals
is essentially a reflection of the economic pressures Cuba experienced in the wake of the U.S.
embargo. President Castro described unauthorized migration from Cuba in July-August 1994 in
the following terms: 'We say that the blockade is the fundamental cause and their [the U.S.) response is fuither blockading ....We say that the fundamental factor compelling mass emigration is economic compulsion and they adopt more compulsive measures.' Reason is on Our Side,
supra note 35 at 10-11. There is independent evidence to support the view that unauthorized
Cuban migration is based primarily on economic considerations. See, e.g., ECKSTEIN, supro note
31 at 121 (citingN.Y. TIMES, June 2,1991, at A24).
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have become political refugees by the time the Jamaican government heard their claims. As previously stated, the asylumseekers may have been entitled to refugee status on the ground
that they had embarrassed the Cuban government by leaving
the country and could reasonably have feared persecution for so
doing; they could have become refugees by the very act of fleeing
Cuba. 10 1 If this is true, the original reason for departure would
not have been determinative of their status as refugees; rather,
their status would depend upon whether they had a "wellfounded fear of persecution" at the time when they applied to the
Jamaican government for asylum.
This approach is fully consistent with the actual wording of
the "refugee" definition in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugees Convention. 10 2 The Convention does not say that a refugee is one
who leaves his homeland owing to a fear of political persecution.
Its wording is quite specific: a refugee is someone who is outside
his or her homeland and who is unable or unwilling to return
home. 103 This specific wording is not fortuitous. As indicated in
the travaux preparatoiresof the Refugees Convention, the reference in the definition to a person who "is outside" his country was
deliberately chosen.' °4 Even the alternative form of words which
the drafters considered-reference one who "has had to leave,
shall leave or remains outside"10 5 his country-would also have
covered the case of a national who becomes a refugee after departure from his country.1 0 6 Therefore, refugee status should be
based on events which have taken place both before and after the
applicant has departed his homeland. 10 7 In other words, the ob101. See supra text accompanying notes 76-97.
102. See Refugees Convention supra note 50.
103. See also Goodwin-Gil, supra note 4, at 24-25; Hyndman, supra note 69, at 149; Chan
Yea Kin v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 90 I.LR. 138 (Austl. 1989); Somaghi v.

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 91 I.L.R. 169, at 177-79 (Austl. 1991).
104. 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 4 at 151 (citing U.N. Doec. FJ1850, at 8; UN Doe.
A/CONF.21SR.23, at 9-10)
105. 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 4, at 151.

106. Id.
107. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees emphasizes this point. The
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status states that:
The requirement that a person must be outside his country to be a refugee
does not mean that he must necessarily have left that country illegally, or even

that he must have left it on account of well-founded fear. The asylum-seeker
may have decided to ask for recognition of his refugee status after having already been abroad for some time.

1996]

CUBAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS

29

jective of those who prepared the Convention was to allow refugees surplace to be entitled to full refugee protection. 0°
It is unfortunate that the Jamaican government paid such
little attention to the possibility that putative economic refugees
from Cuba could have become political refugees by the time they
applied for asylum in Jamaica. The Cuba-Jamaica episode also
points to the need for immigration authorities to exercise special
care in handling refugee issues in the future. In certain circumstances it will be insufficient to ascertain merely why the asylum-seekers departed from their country of nationality. The
authorities should also ascertain why the asylum-seekers wish to
remain outside their country. 109 This comprehensive evaluation
is required by both the spirit and letter of the Refugees Convention.
VI. THE RELEVANCE OF LEGALITY
A basic feature of international refugee protection is that the
granting of refugee status should not depend upon the circumstances under which applicants entered a foreign country. 11 0
Thus, even though the Cuban asylum-seekers arrived in Jamaica
without the requisite entry permits, this fact was irrelevant to
their claim for non-refoulement.
Logically, this position is easy to defend. If an asylumseeker has opted to traverse the seas as a means of escape, it is
UNHCR, HANDBOOK supra note 4, at 22.
108. Certain multilateral treaties and other instruments prepared subsequent to the 1951
Refugees Convention also accept that refugee status may be determined on the basis of events
which have occurred after the asylum-seeker has left the country of his nationality. See, e.g., The
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, art. 1(1) reprinted in 8. I.L.M. 1288 (1969)[hereafter
OAU Convention]; Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees, 1966, art. 1(b) (with reservations on this point expressed by Japan and Thailand) reprinted in UNITED NATIONS HIGH COIvOSSIONER ON REFUGEES, COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES, 201,203 (1979).
109. As noted earlier, the question of cardinal importance for the Eligibility Committee was
why the Cuban asylum-seekers had left Cuba. The argument here is that, in identifying whether
a well-founded fear exists, the issue of why the asylum-seekers wished not to return to Cuba was
of equal significance. The Eligibility Committee does not appear to have thoroughly examined
this argument. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILTY COMMITrEE, supra note 9, at 14.
110. See also the Memorandum to the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees from the U.N. Secretary General, which states that '[i]t would be in keeping with the notion of asylum to exempt
from penalties a refugee, escaping from persecution who after crossing the frontier clandestinely,
presents himself as soon as possible to the authorities of the country of asylum and is recognized
as a bona fide refugee." UN Doc. EIAC.3222, at 46 (1950).
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almost certain that he or she will not have the relevant documentation for entry into the first port of call."' However, the
aim of the refugee determination process is for the receiving
country to assess whether, having arrived without the necessary
papers, it should grant the applicant the right to remain there. 112
Asserting that an asylum-seeker must be repatriated merely because he or she is an "illegal alien" is to summarily deny the person's refugee claim.
As to the law, the Refugees Convention also speaks with
some degree of clarity. Article 31(1) stipulates that:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account
of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their
territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause
for their illegal entry or presence. 113
This provision effectively requires the asylum-seeker who
arrives in a foreign country by clandestine means to declare himself and justify his emigration to the relevant authorities." 4
Having done so, the asylum-seeker then becomes entitled to present his claim for refugee status and non-refoulement pursuant to
Articles 1 and 33(1) of the Convention. 1 5
111. See also 2 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 4, at 199-225; Hyndman, supranote 69, at 148.
112. For further analysis, see 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supranote 4, at 94.
113. From the perspective of protection for asylum-seekers, this provision has weaknesses.
First, the language of the Refugees Convention Article 31(1) could be read as providing protection for persons whom the receiving state has already declared as having refugee status. Then
one could argue that asylum-seekers can be subject to penalties on account of their illegal entry
or presence. By extension, one such penalty could be the denial of refugee status. However, this
reading would only be acceptable to those who take a constitutive view of the refugeedetermination process. Second, the provision appears to contemplate that Article 31(1) protection extends only to persons who have fled their country as a result of threats to life or freedom.
However, some asylum-seekers only become subject to the possibility of persecution after they
have fled their homeland-a point which is recognized in Article 1 of the Refugees Convention.
Refugees Convention, supranote 50.
114. See also In re Ouakli 31 I.LR.. 327 (Belg. 1960). In this case, a Belgian Royal Decree of
1953 was interpreted to mean that asylum-seekers should declare their desire for refugee status
to the relevant authorities at the moment of entry, unless factors beyond the control of the asy.
lum-seeker make this impossible. The Belgian Court of Cassation found that Article 31(1) of the
Refugees Convention 'confirmed by analogy" to the interpretation given to the Royal Decree. Id.
at 327-28.
115. See Yugoslav Refugee Case, 28 I.L. 297 (FRG. 1958). Cf Frank E. Krenz, The
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This interpretation of Article 31(1) is bolstered by Article 14
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1 1 6 which maintains that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution."1 7 Even if the Declaration is
regarded as providing only minimal guidance on the point, 118 it
seems clear that if one has the right to seek asylum from persecution, this right ought not to be denied on the ground that the
person seeking to enjoy this right is an illegal alien." 9 The view
that legality of entry should not be relevant in the refugee de-0
2
termination process is also supported by judicial opinion.
From as early as 1954, Paul Weis, Legal Advisor to the United
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, appeared to consider
this axiomatic by noting that the principle that refugees should
not be forcibly returned home applied "equally to persons whose
residence in the territory has been authorized and to illegal en2
trants."1 1

Refugee as a Subject ofInternationalLaw, 15 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 90,102-06.
116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(Im, U.N. Doc.
A/180 at 71 (1948).
117. Id This provision, as drafted, does not grant to individuals a "right of asylum," but merely
affirms that each individual should have the right to seek and enjoy asylurm. For the legislative
history of Article 14, see Draft International Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 3d Ses., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/265 (1948). See generally Felice Morgenstern, The Right of
Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L.327 (1949); Weis, supra note 53, at 481; GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 53, at 137-38. For critical commentary, see HERSCH IAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 347 (1950).
118. The legal impact of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a matter of substantial discussion outside the scope of this Article. However, it is useful to recall that although
the Declaration was not regarded as a statement of law or legal obligation at the time of its
adoption, it has helped to influence state practice by providing a yardstick against which state
actions are assessed. See, e.g., Statement by Eleanor Roosevelt, 19 DEPT ST. BULL. 751 (1948)
(Chairman of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at the time of the drafting of the Declaration); Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106 HAGUE RECUEIL 5,
32-33, 198-99 (1962-1D); EGON SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:
THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF THE UNrvERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-1963 (1964);
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 570-71 (4th ed., 1990).
119. Cf 2 D. P. CYCONNEI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 740 (1970) (stating Article 14 is "only exhortatory-). General Assembly Resolution 2312 (XXII) (1967) states, inter a//a,that persons entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be rejected at the
border or expelled to any state where he may be persecuted. As a source of binding obligation,
however, this resolution is limited by its rather vague language and by the limitations inherent in
relying on General Assembly Resolutions as sources of international law.
120. Paul Weis, The InternationalProtectionof Refugees, 48 ArvL J. NT L L. 193 (1954). See
also UNHCR, COLLECTED PROCEEDINGS, supranote 4, at 20-21; 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, aupra note
4, at 303.
121. Weis, supranote 120, at 193.
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Despite the force of these arguments, however, the Jamaican
government stated that the Cuban applicants should be returned
to Cuba because they were merely illegal aliens. 122 The government advanced no reasoning in support of this conclusion. 123 At
the same time, the position of the government was not considered
in the report of the Eligibility Committee. It may be unduly
speculative to draw conclusions about the views of the Committee on this point, but there is support for the view that the government, by asserting that the applicants were illegal aliens who
were to be returned home, was sending a strong signal to the
Eligibility Committee on the decision it expected the Committee
to make.
VII.

OPENING THE FLOODGATES?

At various points in the deliberations concerning the Cuban
asylum-seekers, the Jamaican government expressed the fear
that granting the refugees asylum would generate a massive
flight of Cubans into Jamaica.'24 The risk of opening the floodgates to Cubans struck a significant chord among the Jamaican
populace. 2 5 Even some Jamaicans supportive of the Cubans on
influx of Cuhumanitarian grounds were fearful that a heavy
26
bans could strain Jamaica's limited resources.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. The Joint Statement of the Ministries of
National Security and Foreign Affairs on April 10, 1996, characterized the asylum-seekers as
"illegal aliens," a view which was reiterated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the same day.
Asylum Request Rejected Cubans to be Sent Home, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Apr. 11, 1996, at 1.
123. In his presentation to the Jamaican Parliament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs confined his comment on this matter to one sentence: '[Tihe government of Jamaica cannot countenance the illegal entry upon its shores and within its borders of unauthorized boats." Statement
by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 8.
124. See, e.g., Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 8; Government Backs
Down, supranote 16, at 1. At the Press Conference at which the government announced its decision to have the asylum decision reviewed by the Eligibility Committee, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs argued the following: "While [being] very sensitive to humanitarian considerations, the
nation must also bear in mind, that to open the doors of Jamaica to asylum-seeking individuals
on an open-ended basis, would be to open floodgates for an unending stream, which would have
economic costs which the country simply could not afford." Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at8.
125. Most likely for this reason the Minister of Foreign Affairs was careful to emphasize
that the estimated cost of providing shelter, food, and other requirements for the Cubans was
approximately two million Jamaican dollars. As the Minister neither itemized the costs, nor indicated the period of time under consideration, the accuracy ofthis estimate is difficult to assess.
It does, however, create the impression that the asylum-seekers were a significant drain on local
resources. See Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supra note 1, at 2.
126. In recognition ofthis consideration, Sister Joan Clare of the Franciscan Sisters of Ae-
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The fear is shared by other Caribbean governments 127 which
have expressed concern about the political circumstances giving
rise to refugee problems, but have considered themselves unable
to provide asylum for refugees in large numbers. 12s The explanation for this position lies in the level of poverty prevalent in
the region. This problem is well articulated by former Prime
Minister of Dominica, Dame Eugenia Charles, in a response to a
1992 letter of criticism from U.S. Congressman Charles Rangel
concerning Caribbean reluctance to offer solace to Haitian refu129
gees:
We have 10% unemployment and our unemployment is
mainly among urban women and secondary school leavers...
* Our housing plant has always been terrible .... Our drug
problem is growing to our great dissatisfaction and despair..
. . To introduce refugees into our society-refugees for whom

houses would have had to be provided and to whom some sort
of stipend would have been paid-would have introduced explosive elements into our society with which we do not have
the resources to cope. 130
This perspective, though understandable, does not fully resolve the issue of whether the Cuban asylum-seekers in Jamaica
were accorded treatment consistent with international law. Notably, the Refugees Convention makes no mention of resource
considerations in the refugee determination process. Arguably,
the Convention should be more sensitive to the resource considerations, which influence the ability of individual countries to abgany Refugee Office, in her Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs inquired whether the sixty
asylum-seekers could be allowed to remain in Jamaica on the clear understanding that no additional Cubans would be given the same treatment in the future. The Minister responded mainly
by repeating the government's concern about the economic costs of maintaining the asylumseekers. ForeignMinisterDenies Cuban Refigee Deal, JAMAICA OBSERvER, May 25, 1996, at 1.
127. For example, the Bahamas entered into an immigration agreement with Cuba concerning the repatriation of asylum-seekers on August 4, 1994. See JamaicaDevuelue Emigrantes
legales,supra note 24. Dominica has also denied admission to asylum-seekers primarily on economic grounds. Letter from Dame Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica, to Charles B.
Rangel, Member of the U.S. Congress (Mar. 17, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter
dated March 27, 1992].
128. Id.
129. Letter from Charles B. Rangel, Member of the U.S. Congress, to Patrick Manning,
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago in his capacity as the then Chairman of the Caribbean
Community (Jan. 8, 1992) (on file with author).
130. Letter dated March 27, 1992, supranote 127.
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sorb a large influx of refugees.1 31 Nevertheless, the clear language of the Convention is that if an asylum-seeker fits the definition of a refugee, then the principle of non-refoulement should
32
apply.
Therefore, if there was a finding that the Cubans were, in
fact, refugees, the Jamaican government could not employ the
floodgates argument to deny its legal obligation not to return the
Cuban asylum-seekers to Cuba. In the debate about the asylumseekers, this point was often obscured by issues relating to Jamaica's resource problems and by nativist concerns. 33
In the case at hand-concerning only sixty asylum-seekersit is not entirely clear that resource factors should bear much
significance. However, where the inflow is more substantial,
there is a real conflict if small developing countries, which ratify
the Refugees Convention, must accommodate all refugees who
come within their border. In such circumstances, the particular
country concerned may be inclined to ignore the principle of non131. Writing in 1950, Hersch Lauterpacht argued that it would be impracticable to impose
upon a state a rigid duty to receive any number of political offenders and victims of persecution,
without limitation. In his draft of the Bill of Rights, he suggested that each state should have a
duty of asylum, "within the limits of public security and the economic capacity of the State," as
determined by the state. This approach was not taken in the Refugees Convention, but it underlines the notion that the drafters of Convention, and the early signatories, were fully cognizant of
the resources issue. See, LAUTERPACHT, supra note 117, at 345-46. Today, it is also true that
several Western states openly view asylum as a 'restricted good--an item that is made available
only for the few who can document beyond reasonable doubt that they are particularly persecuted in their state of origin. This restrictive perspective may be a reflection, in large part, of
resource constraints in receiving states. So, for instance, in Norway, the immigration authorities
have recently emphasized that "[p]rotection must be viewed as a limited resource. Norway cannot provide protection to all who need it.' Terje Einarsen, Mass Flight The Case for InternationalAsylum, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 551, 555 (1995) (citing Flyktningepolitikken"En kortverajan
av. St.meld, 3 (1994-95)). See generally UNHCR, WORLD'S REFUGEES, supranote 6, at 36-37.
132. Article 33(1) of the Refugees Convention is worded in unequivocal terms: 'No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na.
tionality, membership of a particular socal group or political opinion.' Refugees Convention, aupra note 50, at 176.
133. Some supporters of the decision to repatriate the Cubans also argued that at the time
the Refugees Convention and the 1967 Protocol each entered into force, neither was meant to
cover the mass exodus of refugees. On this view, there has been a fundamental change in circumstances concerning refugee flows and, accordingly, the Convention and Protocol should be
interpreted in light of the new circumstances. In response, it may be noted that: (a) if there has
really been a fundamental change in circumstances, it is open to the states concerned to rely on
the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus to modify their duty of non-refouement; and (b) refugees have
been departing hostile communities in mass numbers since before the Convention entered into
force, and the mass exodus of refugees was certainly within the contemplation of those who negotiated the terms of the 1967 Protocol.
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refoulement.13 4 This serves to undermine the rule of law because
the country, in effect, has opted to disregard a binding obligation.
Alternatively, the concerned country may be tempted to withdraw from the Refugees Convention on the ground that the obligation to accommodate all refugees is simply too onerous.
Clearly, this approach would give full respect to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda.135 On the other hand, it would imply that
the country has reduced its commitment to humanitarian treatment for refugees, a point which could conceivably affect the
country's reputation in interstate relations.
VIII. MuNIcIPAL LAW ISSUES
In matters pertaining to the relationship between international law and municipal law, Jamaica does not follow the incorporation doctrine.1l 6 Hence, although the Refugees Convention is
binding upon Jamaica in its international dealings, the particular rules in the Convention would need to be promulgated as a
local act of Parliament in order to take effect at the municipal
level. Due to the Jamaican Parliament's failure to incorporate
the Convention into Jamaican law, the Cuban asylum-seekers
had no access to the Jamaican courts, and no formal channels of
appeal from the repatriation decision made by the Executive.
Given that sixteen years have passed since Jamaica ratified the
1967 Protocol, it appears that the Convention and Protocol have

been omitted from local legislation by deliberate acts of policy.13 7

In strict legal terms, this approach is consistent with the Refugees Convention, which does not require states to enact its terms.
134. Here the 'exilic" bias of refugee law comes sharply into focus, for small, developing
countries may well see the need for a solution to the underlying problems which prompt the
refugee flow, but, at the same time, find themselves unable to accommodate the refugees.
GERVASE COLES, REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (1989); Vera Gowiland-Debbas, The
Expanding International Concern, 5 PEACE REV. 287, 288-89 (1993). Cf. George Okoth-Obbo,
Coping with a Complex Refugee Crisis in Africa Issues, Problems and Constraints for Refugee
and International Law, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES, 7, 11 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996).
135. Agreements (and stipulations) of the parties (to a contract) must be observed.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1109 (6th ed. 1990).
136. On the relationship between international law and municipal law generally, see
BROWNLIE, supranote 118 at 32-57; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered From the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 68-94

(1957-]I); For a discussion on this relationship in the context of refugee law, see UNHCR,
COLLECIED PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 178.

137. Contrast with countries such as the United States, which has adopted the Refugees
Convention into local law. See The U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
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From the perspective of refugee protection, however, it does not
comport with the ideals of the Convention. Consequently, because there is no local legislation on refugee-protection, the Cuban episode was viewed primarily as a matter of political import.
The idea that there were applicable legal rules and principles received little attention in much of the national debate on the right
to asylum. The fallacy here was to assume that once the Jamaican courts were not involved in determining the matter, then the
38
issues were not legal strictu senso.' Once the issue lost its legal
angle, public discussion rarely focused on the terms of the Refugees Convention.
More importantly, perhaps, the absence of local legislation
on refugees has left the Executive with broad discretion. The
government was prepared to grant a right of appeal to the Cuban
139
asylum-seekers in this case mainly because of social pressure.
Or, as the Eligibility Committee stated, the review of the Cuban
cases was an explicable response to the comments and observations of politicians and citizens, which tended "to imply that the
summarily deported or that deportation was
Cubans were 14being
0
undeserved."
This situation is unsatisfactory because the right of appeal
hinges upon the willingness of politicians and citizens to unite in
support of asylum-seekers. A more reasoned approach is that
recommended by the Executive Committee of the United Nations
High Commissioner's Programme in 1977, under which all refugee applicants would have a reasonable time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of any repatriation order.' 4 ' In order to ensure that appeals exist as a matter of right the Jamaican
legislature must incorporate42the provisions of the Refugees Convention into Jamaican law. 1

138. In this regard, it is significant that the Statement by the Honorable Mullings, which
reviewed the refugee issue for the Jamaican Parliament, contained only passing reference to the

Refugees Convention. Statement by the Honorable Mullings, supranote 1, at 2, 4. See also Vasciannie, supra note 47.
139. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 3. Government Backs Down,
supra note 16, at 1.
140. REPORT OF THE ELIGIBILITY COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 3.
141. UNHCR, HANDBOO, supranote 4, at 46 (citing Official Records of the General Assembly, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Dcc. A/32/12IAdd.l., para. 53(6)(e)).
142. See also Refugee Law Good Idea, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 1996, at 6; Vasciannie,
supra note 47.
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Another municipal issue which arose in the Cuban cases
concerns the composition of the Eligibility Committee, which reviews the original repatriation decision. Three out of the four
members of the review body were also members of the original
body, which had recommended repatriation. 143 Therefore, the
review body is most likely biased in favor of repatriation. 144 The
appearance of bias was buttressed by the fact that the three retained members of the reviewing Committee were civil servants 145 In complex cases, it is perhaps inappropriate for civil
servants to be called upon to make decisions of a judicial character which could contradict the position advocated by the Executive. Such decisions are best left to the judiciary, and for this to
occur, legislation incorporating the Refugees Convention is necessary.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the government provides no legal representation for asylum-seekers. This is a result of the fact
that the government retains the right to determine not only the
composition of the Eligibility Committee, but also the nature of
the proceedings before the Committee. 146 Thus, in contrast with
countries where there are judicial hearings to address asylum
cases,147 the asylum-seeker in Jamaica is often forced to establish
143. The review body had, as its additional member, a distinguished member of the Jamaican judiciary, while the proceedings of the review body were monitored by two nonvoting observers appointed by the government. The criticism advanced here concerns only the structure of the
review body, because all its members are professionals ofhigh integrity.
144. Cf The 1977 Recommendations of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, paragraph 53(6)(e)(vi)the applicant should be allowed to appeal 'either to
the same or to a different authority, whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system." See UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
145. The members of the Eligibility Committee were: Vilma McNish (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Trade), Rerrie Reeves (Ministry of National Security and Justice) and Michelle Walker (Attorney-General's Department). The Chairman of the Eligibility Committee was
Justice James Kerr, while Joan Taffe (United Nations Development Programme) and William
Roper (Norman Manley Law School) were observers.
146. The Eligibility Committee reviewed information each of the asylum-seekers provided
to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recorded interviews. The Eligibility
Committee also interviewed each of the applicants. However, bearing in mind that the Eligibility
Committee interviewed sixty applicants on three afternoons, during April 17, 18 and 22, 1996, it
is likely that the proceedings for individual applicants were conducted with expedition. REPORT
OF THE ELIGIBILITY CONSUTTE, supranote 9, at 3, 6-7.
147. Several countries have implemented legislation concerning the Refugees Convention,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and the Republic of Germany. Such legislation is contemplated in the Protocol to the Refugees Convention. Article 11(2)
stipulates that '[i]n order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner ... to make reports to
the competent organs of the United Nations, the States Parties ... undertake to provide them
with information... concerning... (c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereaf-
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a claim without legal or administrative assistance, or with assistance organized in haste and on an ad hoc basis. If the terms of
the Refugees Convention were incorporated into Jamaican law, it
is likely that there would be some degree of legal representation
for asylum-seekers, at least in the most contentious cases.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The arrival of approximately sixty Cubans on Jamaican
shores in the first half of 1996 prompted a national debate on
refugee policy and generated criticism about the current approach followed by the Jamaican government. Among other
things, the process of refugee determination concerning the Cubans was somewhat opaque: the standard for determining
whether a particular asylum-seeker had a well-founded fear of
persecution was said to be liberal, but this liberalism was never
clearly defined. Furthermore, there was no public dissemination
of information concerning the way in which refugee principles
were applied to any individual case. Members of the government
appeared too willing to use the labels of "economic refugee" and
"illegal alien" to foreclose careful examination of whether individual Cubans could satisfy the definition of refugee incorporated
in the Refugees Convention.
In addition, owing to the Cold War nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, it is likely that broad political considerations influenced
the Jamaican government's repatriation decision. Arguably,
there was a particular desire to spare the Cuban government
some degree of embarrassment because, had the Cubans been
declared refugees, this would have implied that the Cuban regime could not be trusted to safeguard the human rights of the
asylum-seekers. Given the cordial relations between the Jamaican and Cuban governments and the perception within the Caribbean that Cuba has been unfairly victimized through the U.S.
embargo, it is not surprising that the Jamaican government may
have preferred to forego the strict language of the Refugees Convention in this case. 48 This approach may be understandable,
tar be, in force relating to refugees." 1967 Protocol, supra note 51, at 270.

148. It is worthwhile to speculate whether the approach taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would have allowed the Jamaican government to give reftgee status to the Cu.
ban asylum-seekers without embarrassing the Cuban regime. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa retains the definitions in the Refugees
Convention. However, it also adds that refugees include persons who, "owing to external ag-

19961

CUBAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS

but it does little to encourage the idea of refugee protection, and
it creates a bad precedent for future cases.

gression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order'... [are]
compelled to leave their place ofhabitual residence in order to seek refuge... outsde their country of origin or nationality. OAU Convention, supra note 108, at art. I(2). Would it be possible to
argue that pressure by the United States against Cuba, including the economic embargo,
amounts to foreign domination? The approach in the OAU Convention is also put forward in the
Cartegena Dedaraton on Refugees. For a discussion on the OAU Convention and the
Cartegena Declaration, see Jaeger, supranote 57, at 11-12 and Annex HI; Maluwa, supranote 7,
at 661; Eduardo Arboleda. Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin Ameria The Lessons of Pragmatiam, 3 INfIL J. REFUGEE L 185 (1991); Medard Rwelamira, The 1969 OAU Conuention Governing the SpecificAspects of Refugee Problemsin Africa, 1 INTI J. REFUGEE L. 557(1989).

